── Verdict

PARTIAL. The source and the two MEG standards agree that defence against agent attacks depends on shared knowledge of how attacks happen. They differ on what should be shared and on what a trace is worth. The source asks for raw traces. The standards publish curated test material, keep interaction content private, and give evidential weight only to traces recorded independently of the agent.

── What the source says

The post calls for many more public records of AI agents attacking and defending systems. It argues that secrecy favours attackers:

Defenders can't learn from what they can't see.

The author asks holders of such traces who are pressed to keep them private to share them.

── Where it connects

In Minimal Ethical Governance (MEG) v5.0, shared attack knowledge is an obligation. Under Art. 15.3, operators must report new attack vectors to the Benchmark Curation Committee. The Committee adds them to the public, CC0 Reference Prompts Registry. The same work's Principle of Collective Learning requires every Major Ethical Incident report to be published in anonymized form.

MEG2: Legal Governance Framework adds the legal side. In that framework, a trace can establish that a harmful result was induced by external manipulation and was not the agent's own decision. It separates illicit hijacking of control from autonomous decision error. Under Art. 7.2, liability then falls on the attacker, and the bona fide owner is exonerated if it maintained the security measures required for its level. On this reading, traces matter for fairness to the attacked party as well as for defenders' learning.

── Where it does not hold

MEG v5.0 does not support releasing raw traces. Its audit artefacts hold hashes and metadata, not content. The Ethical Flight Recorder (Art. 1.10) records internal state vectors under dual authorization.

MEG2 limits what counts as proof. Forensic recording must be produced independently of the agent. Post-factum accounts by the agent that caused an incident are not evidence. A trace shared outside such a recording layer may still help others learn, but it cannot carry the attribution that exonerates a holder.

Neither work covers disclosures that bypass the operator.

── What the work would propose

The standards would turn private traces into labelled registry entries and publish anonymized incident analyses. They would keep the original trace in an independent forensic record, so it can still decide whether a result was attacker-induced or the agent's own.