Title: Consensus Inversus: Evolution of the Unanimity Mechanism in the European Union
Tags: eu-governance
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A draft proposal for the areas where the European Union decides by unanimity, such as foreign policy, taxation and enlargement. The problem addressed is that one member state can block a decision supported by all the others, and can use that power to obtain concessions elsewhere. **Consensus Inversus** keeps the veto and attaches to it a duty to give reasons.

The procedure has four steps. It starts only when a proposal has the support of at least 22 of 27 states or of states holding 65% of the population. The blocking state then justifies its position, either anonymously or in public, and must attach an alternative compromise that preserves most of the intended effect. The other 26 states hold a secret **resonance vote** on whether the justification is pertinent. If it is found irrelevant, the veto is converted into an opt-out: the rest proceed through enhanced cooperation and the blocking state stays outside the decision. A state that argues in public is protected by a higher threshold (18 of 26 instead of 14).

Further rules limit repeated anonymous use, require figures to be audited by a neutral body, set a scale of consequences for refusing to apply a validated decision, restrict referendums called after the fact, and let a bypassed state rejoin at any time. A twelve-hour fast track is foreseen for security emergencies.

The annexes compare the mechanism with other voting systems, review past blockages, give a justification form with a scoring grid, and argue that the minimum version fits the existing treaties through the duty of loyal cooperation and the Council's rules of procedure. A last annex lists sabotage tactics and countermeasures and reports a simulation of 10,000 voting situations with assumed shares of good-faith, strategic and bad-faith behaviour, in which most legitimate vetoes survive and most abusive ones are bypassed.